Jurisdictional Conflicts Between National Sports Federations andInternational Arbitrational Bodies: The Turkish Experience in Focus

Arbitration mechanisms have become the most important mechanism for resolving disputes in the global industry of sports. As sport grows into a transnational commercial enterprise, the tension between national arbitration framework established under domestic laws and international arbitrational bodies, most notably the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), has intensified. Türkiye represents a particularly striking example of this tension, where the mandatory jurisdiction of the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) Arbitration Committee and similar mechanisms under other sports federations collide with the expectation of CAS supremacy under FIFA and IOC frameworks. This article examines Türkiye’s legal regime, highlights comparative approaches in Europe, illustrates relevant case law, and proposes a model of limited judicial review that could reconcile national and international demands.

The Turkish Legal Framework

The Law No. 5894 on the Establishment and Duties of the Turkish Football Federation is the most significant legislation in Türkiye regarding dispute resolution in sports. Under this law the TFF Arbitration Committee is established as the final and binding appellate authority for disputes in Turkish football. Crucially, Article 6 of the law stipulates that the Committee’s decisions are not subject to judicial review, thereby excluding oversight by national courts.

Similarly, Law No. 7405 on Sports Federations provides other sport federations with authority to establish mandatory internal arbitrations too. While these internal arbitral systems promote uniformity and expediency, they also severely restrict athletes’ and clubs’ access to national courts by insulating arbitral awards from judicial review. The system effectively denies recourse to traditional remedies against unfair or structurally biased decisions.

The international regulator of the football, FIFA, through its statutes (FIFA statute 58) mandate that member associations must establish independent arbitral tribunals, while also recognizing CAS as the ultimate appellate body for international football disputes. CAS awards are binding and recognized by national federations which are associate of the FIFA, globally. However, in Turkish experience, TFF Arbitration Committee decisions cannot be directly appealed before CAS, except where the dispute carries an international element (cross-border transfers, doping in international competition etc.). Therefore, this dualist judicial system generates a structural jurisdictional conflict between Turkish domestic law and international arbitration frameworks.

Jurisdictional Conflicts and Concerns on Fundamental Rights

The most significant criticism of the Turkish arbitral system of sports judicialry has arisen in Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey (2020), before the European Court of Human Rights. In that case the Court emphasized that the TFF Arbitration Committee lacked independence and impartiality, noting that:

“In the light of the above, having regard to the Court’s findings as regards the structural deficiencies of the Arbitration Committee illustrated above on account of the vast powers given to the Board of Directors over its organisation and operation, the Court considers that the applicants had a legitimate reason to doubt that the members of the Arbitration Committee, in the absence of adequate safeguards protecting them against outside pressures, particularly from the Board of Directors, would approach their case with the necessary independence and impartiality” (§222).

Furthermore, the court also found a violation to Article 6 (right to a fair trial), of European Convention on Human Rights due to complete abscence of judicial review:

“It follows that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.” (§223).

In its concluding remarks, the Court noted that these deficencies reflect broader systematic issues:

“The Court notes that the present cases disclose a systemic problem as regards the settlement of football disputes in Turkey. In particular, the violation found indicates that the Arbitration Committee has not been organised in such a way as to ensure its independence from the Board of Directors. Moreover, the TFF Law does not provide appropriate safeguards to protect members of the Arbitration Committee from any outside pressure and enable them to perform their duties with the required level of independence.” (§241).

Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey (2020) is not the only decision which the European Court of Human Rights has emphasized the critical importance of structural independence and procedural fairness in arbitral bodies. Similarly in, Mutu & Pechstein v. Switzerland (2018), the Court of European Human Rights recognized the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) as an independent arbitral institution while emphasizing that procedural safeguards; such as the right to be heard, equality of arms, and reasoned decisions, remain essential to ensure fairness and legitimacy in sports arbitration. The Court stressed:

“In the specific case of sports arbitration, the Court takes the view that it is certainly of interest for the settlement of disputes arising in a professional sports context, especially those with an international dimension, to refer them to a specialised body which is able to give a ruling swiftly and inexpensively. High-level international sports events are held in various countries by organisations based in different States, and they are open to athletes from all over the world. Recourse to a single and specialised international arbitral tribunal facilitates a certain procedural uniformity and strengthens legal certainty; all the more so where the awards of that tribunal may be appealed against before the supreme court of a single country, in this case the Swiss Federal Court, whose ruling is final.

On that point the Court thus agrees with the Government and acknowledges that a non-State mechanism of conflict resolution at first and/or second instance, with the possibility of appeal, albeit limited, before a State court at last instance, could be an appropriate solution in this field.” (§98).

These rulings show that even when arbitral finality is upheld, the absence of independence or basic procedural guarantees can raise serious human rights concerns.

Comparative Perspectives: Germany, France, and Switzerland

Several European jurisdictions provide instructive models for balancing arbitral autonomy with judicial oversight. To illustrate different approaches to balancing arbitral autonomy with judicial oversight, three European jurisdictions, Germany, France, and Switzerland, have been selected. These countries were chosen because they are prominent in international sports law, their legal frameworks are progressive, comprehensive, and well-developed, and they provide clear examples of how limited judicial review can coexist with arbitration finality.

In Germany, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) confronted these issues in the Pechstein case, acknowledging CAS as the legitimate final authority for international sports disputes while affirming that arbitral awards remain subject to limited judicial review, particularly on public policy grounds or where due process is compromised.

France offers a complementary model in the realm of sports arbitration, where judicial review is permitted under specific circumstances. French administrative courts, including the Conseil d’État, allow limited judicial review of sports arbitration decisions when issues of public policy, fundamental rights, or gross procedural unfairness arise. This approach maintains constitutional guarantees while respecting the autonomy of sports arbitration.

A pertinent example is the case involving the French Football Federation (FFF) and the prohibition of players wearing religious symbols during matches. In Association Alliance Citoyenne et autres (Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 29 June 2023, nos. 458088), the Conseil d’État upheld the FFF's regulation, emphasizing the federation's duty to ensure neutrality in public service and the protection of public order. The court reasoned:

“The ban on the wearing of any symbols or clothing ostensibly expressing a political, philosophical, religious or trade union affiliation, which is limited to the time and place of football matches, appears necessary to ensure that matches run smoothly … Consequently, the French Football Federation was legally entitled … to issue such a ban, which is appropriate and proportionate” (§14).

At the same time, the Conseil d’État stressed that such restrictions must remain proportionate and justified by legitimate public interests, thereby acknowledging the continuing role of fundamental rights in reviewing federation rules.

This case illustrates how France navigates the balance between upholding the autonomy of sports federations and ensuring compliance with fundamental rights and public policy considerations.

Switzerland, as the host state of CAS, provides perhaps the most balanced framework. Under the Federal Act on Private International Law (PILA), CAS awards may be challenged before the Swiss Federal Tribunal on strictly limited grounds, such as lack of jurisdiction, procedural irregularity, violation of public policy, or improper constitution of the tribunal. This system preserves CAS finality while safeguarding against fundamental injustices, exemplifying a careful equilibrium between arbitral authority and judicial oversight.

Scope of Limited Judicial Review

Drawing on these comparative insights, a model of limited judicial review emerges as an effective means to reconcile national sports arbitration with international obligations. Courts may intervene where procedural safeguards are violated, the arbitral body lacks independence or impartiality, or where awards contravene fundamental public policy. Germany and France provide examples of public policy review as a targeted safeguard, while Switzerland demonstrates how strict grounds for appeal can preserve finality without undermining justice.

Towards a Solution for Turkey

Türkiye’s current legal framework, which imposes a blanket prohibition on judicial review of arbitral awards, creates both constitutional tension within domestic law and incompatibility with international standards. Therefore, sustainable solution requires recalibrating the system rather than dismantling its arbitral structure altogether. The reform which can make this legal framework more compatible with international sports law could begin with targeted amendments to Law No. 5894 on the Turkish Football Federation and Law No. 7405 on Sports Federations, introducing a narrowly defined scope of judicial review. Such  a mechanism would not undermine arbitral autonomy but would allow national courts to intervene in exceptional cases where fundamental rights are at stake, such as breaches of due process, lack of independence, or violations of public policy.

Equally important is the establishment of genuine structural safeguards to ensure independence and impartiality. This could include transparent and independent procedures for the appointment of arbitrators, thereby reducing the risk of federation dominance over arbitral bodies. Furthermore, aligning Turkish sports arbitration with CAS’s appellate jurisdiction is essential. Enabling disputes with international dimensions, such as doping violations or cross-border transfers, to be referred to CAS without obstruction would harmonize the Turkish regime with FIFA and IOC frameworks while also reflecting international legal standards.

In addition, bringing Türkiye into compliance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights by adopting such reforms will also reinforce the actors of industry’s trust in the fairness of the arbitral processes in sports industry. Therefore, Türkiye could preserve the efficiency and finality of arbitration while ensuring that its sports dispute resolution system meets the fundamental requirements of independence, fairness, and access to justice.

Conclusion

In this context the Turkish example not only illustrates most clearly how compulsory and judicially unreviewable arbitral structures within national federations can conflict with the international sports arbitration framework, but also shows that the absolute finality of the TFF Arbitration Committee is incompatible with both the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the standards envisaged under the FIFA-CAS system. However, this conflict is not special to Türkiye; it rather represents a typical manifestation of jurisdictional tensions between national sports arbitration and international arbitration more broadly. As the Turkish case demonstrates, the most appropriate way to reconcile these two systems is through recognition of judicial review. Such a model can preserve the internal autonomy of federations and the efficiency of arbitration, while at the same time safeguarding fundamental guarantees such as independence, impartiality, and the right to a fair trial. Accordingly, the issues projected in the Turkish context and the reform proposals that could be implemented in its domestic legal framework are equally relevant for other jurisdictions with similar legislation and arbitral structures. These reforms would not only secure the right to a fair trial at the national level, but also contribute to enchancing coherence and efficiency within the international sports industry and its governance.

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