I. PARADOX

The 2025 International Arbitration Survey by the School of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London and White & Case (“Survey”) inter-alia suggests that award debtors, especially private parties “generally voluntarily comply” with arbitral awards. Adding that only 12% of respondents reported that voluntary compliance “rarely occurs”, and 4% reporting it “never occurs”.[1]

That said, the record of setting-aside and enforcement proceedings before national courts tells a different story. A 2022 survey of commercial arbitration awards in the Kluwer database, covering awards rendered between 2010 and 2020, identified 504 vacatur actions and 553 enforcement actions across 74 jurisdictions.[2] While research databases are not intended to be comprehensive set of data of all pending cases, these numbers suggest that a large proportion of awards are contested.

In this context, this note presents a summary of recent trends in judicial measures to enforce compliance with commercial arbitration awards. An ongoing dispute between the Republic of India and certain investors is presented as an example of Bilateral Investment Treaty mechanisms being employed to secure compliance by state owned entities. Some ideas are suggested to enable compliance.

II. FRAMEWORK

Voluntary compliance refers to an award debtor satisfying a commercial arbitration award (“Award”) without any set-aside or enforcement proceedings being commenced. Compelled compliance, by contrast, arises after such proceedings are initiated. Article III of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) (“New York Convention”) and Article 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985) inter-alia stipulate that an Award is binding once rendered by a tribunal.[3] Some national laws are in more definitive terms.[4]

Equally, however, almost all national laws stipulate setting aside remedies against an Award. [5] Should an Award debtor not comply, and the Award not be set aside, the Award holder may pursue proceedings for enforcement of the Award. [6] The legal framework therefore contemplates voluntary compliance as the default, while providing compelled compliance as the necessary corrective - yet it offers no guarantee that either will result in actual recovery.

III. ANALYSIS

This author’s review of 48 court decisions from 18 jurisdictions covered in the ICCA Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration (2024 edition) reveals that most courts apply a strong pro-enforcement bias consistent with the New York Convention.[7] Several trends are worth highlighting.

Proceedings for enforcement and execution are typically bifurcated. Jurisdictions including Brazil[8], Chile[9], Germany[10], Hungary, India[11] and Italy require separate proceedings for enforcement and for execution. This two-step process may delay compliance. By contrast, Ecuador[12], Georgia[13], Hong Kong[14], Iran[15] and Pakistan[16] treat recognition as having immediate executory effect, streamlining compliance.

Türkiye too follows a bifurcated approach. Foreign arbitral awards are not automatically enforceable in Türkiye; the award creditor must file an enforcement action before a competent Turkish court and obtain a recognition and enforcement decision - known as a tenfiz kararı. This renders the award equivalent to a Turkish court judgment. Once the enforcement decision becomes final, the award holder may initiate separate execution proceedings through the Turkish Enforcement and Bankruptcy Offices (İcra Müdürlükleri), which may include seizure of assets, garnishment of bank accounts, or other compulsory measures. Türkiye therefore falls in the same category as Brazil, Chile, Germany and India in requiring two distinct procedural stages before compliance can be compelled

Public policy remains a contested ground. Courts in Russia have declined to enforce Awards where the claimant was connected to an ‘unfriendly’ state a departure from orthodox New York Convention interpretation.[17] Courts in the People’s Republic of China refused enforcement of an ICC Award because it was not served on the debtor.[18] By contrast, U.S. courts construe public policy narrowly, limiting it to violations of the ‘most basic notions of morality and justice’- a threshold that is seldom met.[19] Nigerian courts have similarly adopted a substance-over-form approach, rejecting procedural objections designed to frustrate enforcement.[20]

Delays persist even after enforcement is granted. In at least one reported Indian case, enforcement was granted on 30 May 2023, yet the Award remains unsatisfied. A contempt petition against the Award debtor is pending.[21] This underscores a fundamental point: enforcement orders and actual recovery are not the same thing.

The ongoing dispute involving Devas Multimedia Private Limited (“Devas”) and the Republic of India illustrates the difficulties of enforcing Awards against state owned entities. In brief: an ICC arbitral tribunal issued an Award of approximately USD 562.5 million against Antrix Corporation, the commercial arm of India’s state-administered ISRO. India’s response included the liquidation of Devas (the Award holder) on grounds of fraud; and the use of the resulting liquidation order as res judicata to set aside the ICC Award before the Delhi High Court.[22] The Supreme Court of India confirmed this outcome in October 2023.

While enforcement efforts are ongoing in multiple jurisdictions, Devas’ investors have also commenced a second BIT arbitration alleging, among other things, that India engaged in retaliatory measures including judicial expropriation of the ICC Award.[23] In effect, the investors are seeking compliance with a commercial arbitration Award by initiation of investment treaty arbitration.

IV. IDEAS

Compliance strategy should begin well before the Award is rendered. Subject to satisfying established legal standards, claimants in an arbitration should consider: (i) seeking interim orders for disclosure of assets and maintenance of status quo on assets; and (ii) engaging asset tracing experts to identify the location and nature of the debtor’s assets before an Award is rendered.

On rendering an Award, practitioners should assess enforcement-friendly jurisdictions in which the debtor holds assets and commence enforcement proceedings promptly. Where the debtor has assets in multiple jurisdictions, parallel enforcement actions may be appropriate. Interim orders of protection must be sought pending hearing and final disposal of the enforcement proceedings.[24] Practitioners should also consider the reputational leverage the Award provides. The Delos Rules’ Compliance Reinforcement Mechanism, for instance, enables publication of a ‘Compliance Failure Notice’ against a defaulting debtor.[25] Delos confirms that the process has been effective as leverage to induce negotiated resolution without any notice being published yet.

Against state or state-owned debtors, practitioners must navigate both enforcement procedure and the sovereign immunity doctrine. The general trend toward a restrictive approach to state immunity is encouraging, but significant variation persists. BIT mechanisms may offer an additional avenue to enjoin compliance with an Award, where the state is the debtor.[26]

V. CONCLUSION

Voluntary compliance with international commercial arbitration Awards is not the natural order of affairs. It is the product of legal pressure, reputational calculus, commercial pragmatism, and all too often - protracted litigation. Perception-based surveys may be methodologically insufficient to establish that voluntary compliance is the norm.

Several reforms would materially improve the compliance landscape. National courts should integrate enforcement and execution into a single phase where possible. Arbitral institutions could implement systematic post-award monitoring, even on an anonymised basis, to generate reliable compliance data.[27] Tribunals should be empowered, where the lex arbitri permits, to order asset disclosure and provision of security as a matter of course.

Above all, practitioners should approach post-Award compliance as a matter requiring active, strategic management beginning well before the Award is rendered. The arbitral award is not the finish line. In a number of cases, it is the starting gun.

REFERENCES

[1] White & Case & Queen Mary Univ. of London, 2025 International Arbitration Survey: Adapting Arbitration to a Changing World 4, 12 (2025), https://www.qmul.ac.uk/arbitration/media/arbitration/docs/White-Case-QMUL-2025-International-Arbitration-Survey-report.pdf. The Survey acknowledges that respondents were instructed to answer questions based on experience, yet some interviewees admitted their answers were influenced by perceptions rather than actual experience; some interviewees noted their perceptions would significantly change if made aware of even single instances of non-compliance [hereinafter White & Case & QMUL Survey].

[2] Roger P. Alford, Crina Baltag, Matthew E. Hall & Monique Sasson, Empirical Analysis of National Court Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration Awards, 39 J. Int'l Arb. 299, 303 (2022)..

[3] UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 35, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985, as amended 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].

[4] See, e.g., Bolivia, Ley de Conciliación y Arbitraje [Conciliation and Arbitration Law], Ley No. 708 de 2015, art. 109(II) ("El Laudo Arbitral ejecutoriado tendrá valor de sentencia pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada y será de obligatorio e inexcusable cumplimiento desde la notificación a las partes con la resolución que así lo declare.").

[5] UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 3, art. 34.

[6] UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 3, art. 36.

[7] ICCA Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. XLIX (2024) [hereinafter Yearbook].

[8] Amazon Lines Ltd. (Bahamas) v. Di Gregorio Navegação Ltda., in Yearbook, supra note 7, Brazil No. 65, ¶ 15 (Superior Tribunal de Justiça).

[9] Qidong Adi Tools Mfg. Co. v. Import Export Italy Trading SpA, in Yearbook, supra note 7, Chile No. 11, ¶ 9 (Corte Suprema de Justicia de Chile, First Civil Chamber, Case No. 124338-2020, July 5, 2023).

[10] Not Indicated v. Not Indicated, in Yearbook, supra note 7, Germany No. 172 (Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court], First Civil Chamber, Case No. I ZB 33/22, Mar. 9, 2023).

[11] Nuovopignone Int'l Srl v. Cargo Motors Pvt. Ltd., in Yearbook, supra note 7, India No. 72 (High Court of Delhi, Case No. OM P(EFA)(COMM) 11/2021, May 30, 2023).

[12] Yearbook (n 7), Ecuador No 3, CW Travel Holdings NV v Seitur Agencia de Viajes y Turismo Cía Ltda, Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Case No 3232-19-EP, Decision No 3232-19-EP/24 (9 May 2024).

[13] "F-I" Ltd. v. ASPA, in Yearbook, supra note 7, Georgia No. 1 (Supreme Court of Georgia, Case No. 5322-sh-127-2020, Jan. 20, 2022).

[14] Arbitration Ordinance, (Cap. 609) s. 84 (H.K.).

[15] Bazargani Petroshimi Corp. v. Bazargani Karavaran Corp., in Yearbook, supra note 7, Iran No. 6, ¶ 8 (Civil Court, Sadr Judicial Complex, Tehran, Chamber 36, Case No. 9709972160101240, Jan. 16, 2019).

[16] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, § 21, O. XXI r. 10 (Pak.).

[17] Int'l Transit SAL (Off-Shore) v. Nevinnomyssk Electro-Metallurgical Plant LLC, in Yearbook, supra note 7, Russia No. 63 (Arbitrazh Court, North Caucasus Circuit, Case No. A63-7553/2022, May 15, 2023).

[18] Fairdeal Supplies Ltd. v. Shanxi Coal Imp. & Exp. Grp. Co., in Yearbook, supra note 7, China PR No. 47 (Intermediate People's Court, Shanxi Province, Taiyuan, Case No. (2012) Bing Min Que Zi No. 2, May 13, 2016); Fairdeal Supplies Ltd. v. Shanxi Coal Imp. & Exp. Grp. Co., in Yearbook, supra note 7, China PR No. 49 (Intermediate People's Court, Shanxi Province, Taiyuan, Case No. (2018) Jin 01 Minchu No. 921, Nov. 21, 2019).

[19] Krohmer Marina LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, in Yearbook, supra note 7, United States No. 1064 (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Okla., Case No. 20-CV-402-JWB, Feb. 9, 2023).

[20] La Société Nationale d'Opérations Pétrolières de la Côte d'Ivoire (PETROCI) v. MRS Holdings Ltd., in Yearbook, supra note 7, Nigeria No. 9 (Federal High Court of Nigeria, Lagos Judicial Division, Case No. FHC/L/CS/952/2021, Apr. 7, 2022).

[21] Nuovopignone Int'l Srl v. Cargo Motors Pvt. Ltd., High Court of Delhi, Case No. OMP (EFA)(COMM) 11/2021.

[22] Antrix Corp. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia Pvt. Ltd., High Court of Delhi, ¶ 160 (Aug. 29, 2022).

[23] CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2022-34.

[24] Österreichischer Lloyd Seereederei (Cyprus) Ltd. v. Victore Ships Pvt. Ltd., High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 398 of 2025 (Mar. 10, 2026).

[25] Delos Rules of Arbitration art. 16 (2021).

[26] See, e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ¶ 127 (Mar. 21, 2007); Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, ¶¶ 128, 202 (June 30, 2009).

[27] See, e.g., Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Compliance with and Enforcement of ICSID Awards (Background Paper, June 2024), https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Paper.pdf.